By Sari Pietikäinen, Alexandra Jaffe, Helen Kelly-Holmes, Nik Coupland
Sociolinguistics from the Periphery "presents a fascinating book about change: shifting political, economic and cultural conditions; ephemeral, sometimes even seasonal, multilingualism; and altered imaginaries for minority and indigenous languages and their users"
Davidson, Donald (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, xxii+324pp, paperback ISBN 0-19-924627-0, $21.95 (1st ed., 1980)
Sharbani Banerji, Ghaziabad, India.
DESCRIPTION OF THE BOOK
The first edition of the book was published in 1980, and the second in 2001. The first fifteen essays of the first edition are reprinted in the second edition, to which, two new essays have been added. The first fifteen essays are divided into three sections. Each section contains five essays.
The three sections are:
I) Intention and Action II) Event and Cause III) Philosophy of Psychology
Besides the essays in these three sections, the two new essays which have been added in the Appendices, are:
A) Adverbs of Action(1985) and B) Reply to Quine on Events(1985)
All the essays in this book have already been published elsewhere. Over the decades, these essays have attracted a lot of attention, comments, criticism etc., and have given rise to new writings. According to Davidson, though there are many things he would like to change today, what still remains right, is the emphasis on the logical form of sentences that are used to talk of actions, events and causality etc.
Each section has a common theme, as suggested by the title of the section, and the various essays in that section address the finer points of that theme. Though the central theme of this book is the role of causal concepts in human action, and which is where the concept of 'intention' and its various shades as depicted in Section I come in, an extremely important issue has been addressed in Section II, which is, defining event as an 'object or individual'. Section III is in many ways related to Section I. In the Appendices, the essay 'Adverbs of Action' once again proves that 'events' should be treated as 'entities'.
In all these essays, Davidson uses numerous examples, not only to state the problem, and then to build his thesis, but also to counter the claims of earlier philosophers, logicians, and in some cases even psychologists. Starting from the works of Aristotle, Davidson quotes and argues on the works of Anscombe, Austin, Cargile, Castaï¿½eda, Chisholm, John Donne, Ducasse, Feinberg, Grice, Hume, Hobbes, Anthony Kenny, Lemmon, Melden, Mill, Moore, Frank Ramsey, Reichenbach, Strawson, Wittgenstein, von Wright and Quine, to name only a few.
These counterarguments are presented in the form of 'replies' to earlier works, and in a few cases, the entire essay is a discussion, or a reply to the work of another philosopher, viz.,
Essay 14 'Hempel on explaining action' Essay 15 'Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride' Appendix B 'Reply to Quine on Events'
Some of the essays are further followed by replies to the criticism of Davidson's works by other philosophers. They are indicated at the end of the relevant essays.
Since in a review of this type, it is impossible to present the examples and arguments of other philosophers that Davidson quotes and then counters, I shall concentrate mainly on Davidson's solution to the problems taken up in each chapter.
SECTION I: INTENTION AND ACTION
ESSAY 1. ACTIONS, REASONS AND CAUSES (1963) 'Actions, Reasons and Causes' was a reaction against a widely accepted doctrine that the explanation of an intentional action in terms of its motives or reasons could not relate reasons and actions as cause and effect. Instead, Davidson defends the ancient and common sense position that 'rationalization' is a species of causal explanation.
What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?
We may call such explanations 'rationalizations', and say that the reason 'rationalizes' the action.
Whenever someone does something for a reason, he can be characterized as:
a) having some sort of pro attitude towards actions of a certain kind and b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind.
Giving the reason why an agent did something is often a matter of naming (a) the pro attitude or (b) the related belief or both;
Davidson calls this pair the 'primary reason', the reason why the agent performed the action. Now, it is possible both to reformulate the claim that rationalizations are causal explanations and to give structure to the argument by stating the following two thesis about primary reasons.
1) In order to understand how a reason of any kind rationalizes an action it is necessary and sufficient that we see how to construct a primary reason.
2) The primary reason for an action is its cause.
To know a primary reason why someone acted as he did is to know an intention with which the action was done.
States, dispositions and conditions are frequently named in the causes of events. That is, there is a mental event, to qualify as causes of action.
ESSAY 2. HOW IS WEAKNESS OF THE WILL POSSIBLE? (1969) An agent's will is weak if he acts, and acts intentionally, counter to his own best judgement; in such cases we say he lacks the will power to do what he knows, or at any rate believes, would be better. Davidson calls such actions 'incontinent'.
Davidson's conception of incontinence is more general than some others. If a man holds some course of action as the best one, the thing he ought to do, and yet does something else, he acts incontinently.
Davidson characterizes an action that reveals weakness of the will or incontinence, as follows:
In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if:
a) the agent does x intentionally; b) the agent believes that there is an alternative action y open to him; c) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x.
Two principles have been proposed:
P1) If an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do y, and he believes himself free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally.
P2) If an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then he wants do x more than he wants to do y.
P1 and P2 together obviously entail that if an agent judges that it would be better for him to do x than to do y, and he believes himself to be free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally. The conclusion would however show that:
It is FALSE that: P3) There are incontinent actions.
Then, how to explain the problem of incontinence?
A judgement that a is better than b, all things considered, is a relational or a prima facie (pf) judgement, and so cannot conflict logically with any unconditional judgement.
'a is better than b, all things(viz., all truths, moral and otherwise) considered', surely does entail 'a is better than b'. The phrase 'all things considered' must, of course, refer only to things known, believed, or held by the agent, the sum of his relevant principles, opinions, attitudes, and desires.
It is possible then to be incontinent even if P1 and P2 are true. The incontinent man acts and judges irrationally.
What is special in incontinence is that the actor cannot understand himself: he recognizes, in his own intentional behaviour, something essentially surd.
ESSAY 3. AGENCY (1971) This essay on 'Agency', asks what the relation is between an agent and an event that makes the event an action.
Can we say which events involve agency?
Intentional actions do, and so do some other things we do. What is the common element?
A man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional.
If we can say, that a person does as an agent, whatever he does intentionally, under some description, then, although the 'criterion' of agency is in the semantic sense, intentional, the 'expression' of agency is itself purely extensional. The relation that holds between a person and an event, when the event is an action performed by the person, holds regardless of how the terms are described. Therefore, we can speak of the class of events that are actions, which we cannot do with intentional actions.
Causality is central to the concept of agency, but it is ordinary causality between events that is relevant, and it concerns the effects and not causes of actions (discounting the possibility of analysing intention in terms of causality). One way to bring this out is by describing what Joel Feinberg calls the 'accordion effect'. The 'accordion effect' will not reveal in what respect an act is intentional.
The accordion effect is limited to agents. If Jones intentionally swings a bat that strikes a ball that hits and breaks a window, then Jones not only struck the ball but also broke the window, though of course, the movement of the ball caused the breakage.
The collapse of all actions into the primitive, which is marked in syntax by the accordion effect, leads to a vast simplification of the problem of agency, for it shows that there is a relation between a person and an event when it is his action, that is independent of the how the terms of the relation are described.
ESSAY 4. FREEDOM TO ACT (1973) In this essay, Davidson tries to defuse some arguments that have been taken to show that freedom to act cannot be a causal power. At the same time, although freedom to act is a causal power, it cannot be analysed or defined, at least without appeal to the notion of 'intention'.
It is natural to say that a person can do something (or is free to do it) if all that is required, if he is to do it, is that he WILLS to do it. But, does 'He would do it if he were to will to do it' express a causal disposition? If willing is an act distinct from doing, it might be a cause, but the question would then arise when an agent is free to will. If willing is not an act distinct from doing, then it cannot be a cause of the doing.
According to Davidson, causal power means, a change of certain sort in the object causes an event of another sort. The concept of causal power is indifferent to the intuitive distinction between active and passive.
There can be a great difference between
'The heat caused Samantha to return to Patna.' and 'The heat caused Samantha's return to Patna.'
The former implies a limitation on Samantha's freedom of action; the latter does not. Thus, an action may be caused without the agent being caused to perform it.
There is thus a two-part theory of what a man can do:
A) One part aims to explain what he can do intentionally B) The other part extends this to what the intentional would cause.
In order to be eligible as a cause, the event must be separate from the action. If so, one should be able to ask about 'it', whether the agent is free to do it.
According to Davidson, 'choosing', 'willing', 'trying', 'intending' etc., are not cause of an action, but are ways of characterizing the action chosen, willed, tried, intended etc. They are not descriptions of further actions, events or states.
The only hope for the causal analysis is to find states or events which are causal conditions for intentional actions. The most eligible such states or events are the beliefs and desires of an agent that 'rationalize' an action.
Davidson suggests the following formulation of what a man can do:
A can do x intentionally (under the description d) means that if A has desires and beliefs that rationalize x (under d), then A does x.
The antecedent condition (A has desires and beliefs that rationalize x) is prior to and separate from the action, and so is suited to be a cause(in this case, it is state, rather than an event - but this could be changed along these lines: 'coming to have desires and beliefs that rationalize x').
If rationalizing attitudes do cause an action of mine, then not only does the action occur, but, it is under rationalized descriptions intentional. What an agent does intentionally is what he is free to do and has adequate reasons for doing.
Thus Davidson argues that freedom to act is the causal power of the agent.
Essay 5. INTENDING (1978) This essay tries to find out the correlation between an 'intended action', and 'pure intending'.
Someone may intend to build a squirrel house without having decided to do it, deliberated about it, formed an intention to do it, or reasoned about it. And despite his intention, he may never build a squirrel house, or do anything whatever to get a squirrel house built. Pure intending of this sort, intending that may occur without practical reasoning, action, or consequence, poses a problem if we want to give an account of the concept of intention.
When action is added to intention, i.e., when someone who acts with a certain intention, acts for a reason-he wants to accomplish something; e.g., a man who nails boards together with the intention of building a squirrel house must believe that by doing so he will advance his project.
Acting with an intention does not require that there be any mysterious act of the will or special attitude or episode of willing. There need be only desires or other pro attitudes, beliefs and the actions themselves.
Intending without conscious deliberation or overt consequence leaves no room for doubt that intending is a state or event separate from the intended action or the reason that prompted the action. Pure intending merely shows that there is something there to be abstracted.
I) Is pure intending an action?
'Coming to have an intention' is a change that may take place so slowly or unnoticed, that an agent cannot say when it happened. Still, it is an event, and we could call it an action, or at least something the agent does.
II) Is intending to act a belief that one will?
Davidson gives strong arguments against identifying pure intending with belief one will do what one intends. That is, reasons for intending to do something are in general quite different from reasons for believing one will do it.
III) Is intending to so something the same as wanting to do it?
Davidson argues at length to prove that:
Intending and wanting belong to the same genus of pro attitudes, expressed by value judgements. Wants, desires, principles prejudices, felt duties, and obligations provide reasons for actions and intentions, and are expressed by prima facie judgements; intentions and the judgements that go with intentional actions are distinguished by their all-out unconditional form. Pure intending constitute a subclass of the all-out judgements, those directed to future action of the agent and made in the light of his beliefs.
SECTION II: EVENT AND CAUSE
ESSAY 6. THE LOGICAL FORM OF ACTION SENTENCES (1967) This essay is about getting the logical form of simple sentences about action straight.
Consider sentences like:
'Jones did it slowly, deliberately, in the bathroom, with a knife, at midnight'.
What he did was butter a piece of toast. The 'it' refers to some entity, presumably an action.
One might suggest the Logical form of the sentence to be:
'There is an action x, such that Jones did x slowly, and Jones did x deliberately, and Jones did x in the bathroom,...' and so on.
But then, we need an appropriate singular term to substitute for x. If we replace x by 'Jones buttered a piece of toast', we get a logical form like: 'Jones buttered a piece of toast slowly, Jones buttered a piece of toast deliberately, and Jones buttered a piece of toast in the bathroom,. . .' and so on. But the problem here is that this logical form does not indicate that any 'one' action was slow, deliberate, and in the bathroom, etc., though this is what is meant by the original.
Consider the sentence:
1) Jones buttered the toast slowly, deliberately, in the bathroom, at midnight, with a knife.
'deliberately' alone imputes 'intention', and cannot be treated on par with other modifying clauses.
'slowly', unlike other adverbial clauses fails to introduce a new entity,(a place, an instrument, a time), and also may involve special difficulty.
The question is, what was slow here'?
Ignoring the first two adverbial modifiers in 1) for the present, what will be the logical form of :
2) Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom, with a knife, at midnight.
Most philosophers would analyse this sentence as containing a five place predicate with the argument places filled in the obvious ways, with singular terms or bound variables. Eg.,
if 'Jones buttered the toast' is a two place predicate,
'Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom' as a three place predicate, etc..
But this way, we obliterate the logical relations between these sentences, namely, that 2) entails the others.
Anthony Kenny rejects the suggestion that 'Jones buttered the toast' be considered as elliptical for 'Jones buttered the toast somewhere with something at sometime', which would restore the wanted entailments, on the grounds that we can never be sure how many standby positions to provide in each predicate of action. That is, Kenny points out the problem of 'variable polyadicity' of action verbs.
For the sentence: 3) Amundsen flew to the North Pole in May 1926.
Davidson modifies Reichenbach's doctrine, and suggests the following Logical Form:
4) (Ex)(x consists in the fact that Amundsen flew to the North Pole, and x took place in May 1926).
Formula 4) alone would give the logical form of the sentence 3):
This way, Kenny's problem of variable polyadicity' of action verbs is solved. There is actually, no variable polyadicity, if events are introduced as entities about which an indefinite number of things can be said. According to Reichenbach, ordinary action sentences have an existential quantifier binding an action variable. If we think that 3) describes a single event, we are misled. It does not describe any event at all. But, if 3) is true, then there is an event that makes it true.
Thus, Davidson's analysis of action sentences:
The basic idea is that verbs of action--verbs that say 'what someone did'-- should be construed as containing a place for singular terms or variables, that do not appear to be there normally. E.g.,
'Shem kicked Shaun'
would in general, be considered to consist in two names and a two place predicate.
According to Davidson, however, 'kicked' is a three place predicate, with the form:
5) (Ex)(kicked(Shem, Shaun, x)).
About prepositions, Davidson has following to say:
In general, we conceal logical structure when we treat prepositions as integral parts of verbs; prepositions should be contributing structure in the following way:
A sentence like
'I flew my spaceship to the Evening Star'
should have the following logical form:
6) (Ex)(Flew(I, my spaceship, x)& To(the Evening Star, x)).
>From 6) one can infer 7):
7) (Ex)(Flew(I, my Spaceship, x)).
If we had taken 'flew' as a four-place predicate, this inference would have been obscured.
Similarly, Logical form the expression that introduces 'intention' would be:
'It was intentional of x that p'.
where x names the agent, and 'p' is a sentence that says the agent did something.
This essay is followed by: Reply to Lemmon on Tenses, Reply to Lemmon on Identity Conditions for Events, Reply to Castaï¿½eda on Agent and patient, Reply to Castaï¿½eda on Prepositions, Reply to Castaï¿½eda on Intention, Reply to Chisholm on making happen, Reply to Martin, Reply to Cargile, and Reply to Hedman.
ESSAY 7. CAUSAL RELATIONS (1967) Essay seven applies the lesson of essay six to causality.
What is the logical form of singular causal statement like 'The flood caused the famine', 'The stabbing caused Csesar's death', etc.?
Much of what philosophers have said of causes and causal relations is intelligible only on the assumption that causes are individual events and causal relations hold between events. So far as logical form of causal statements is concerned, the relation of causality between events can be expressed by an ordinary two-place predicate in an ordinary, extensional first order language. But, this should not be confused with the analysis of causality, e.g., an analysis of subjunctives, counterfactual conditionals etc.
However, a host of statements challenge the account just given. E.g., ''The failure of the sprinkling system caused the fire'', ''The slowness with which the controls were applied caused the rapidity with which the inflation developed''. Though failures can be counted amongst events, others are just rudimentary causal explanations. According to Davidson, statements typically relate statements, not events. Such statements according to Davidson, 'causally explains', but is not the 'caused' of the straightforward singular causal statement.
According to Davidson, 'caused' is sometimes a relation, sometimes a connective.
ESSAY 8. THE INDIVIDUATION OF EVENTS (1969) When are two events identical? Or, when is one event identical with another?
To prove his thesis, Davidson first shows how events should be taken as 'entities', and next gives the conditions under which they can be identical.
Talking about 'identity of events', there is 'No entity without identity', and its linguistic counterpart would be:
'No statements of identity without singular terms'.
Of course, there are singular terms that name events. E.g., 'Sally's third birthday party', 'the first performance of Lulu in Chicago' etc.
Are there good reasons for taking events seriously as entities? There are indeed.
1) First, under a satisfactory theory of action, we should be able to talk literally of the same action under different descriptions.
2) Second, the most perspicuous forms of the identity theory of mind require that we identify mental events with certain physiological events; if such theories or their denials are intelligible, events must be individuals.
3) Without events it is not possible to give a natural and acceptable account of the logical form of certain sentences of the most common sorts, e.g.,
'Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m.'
'Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna'.
That the entailed sentence is contained in the entailing sentence, is NOT reflected in the usual logical form assigned to each sentence, which is, the first sentence contains an irreducibly three-place predicate 'x strolled through y at t', while the second contains an UNRELATED predicate 'x strolled through y'.
Davidson proposes to legitimize our intuition that events are true particulars by recognizing explicit references to them, or quantification over them, in much of our ordinary talk. E.g., consider
This may be construed as
'There is an x such that Sebastian strolled x'.
In this way, we provide each verb of action or change with an event-place; we may say of such verbs that they take an event-object. Then, adverbial clauses modify not verbs, but events that certain verbs introduce.
'Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m.' then has the following form:
'There is an event x such that Sebastian strolled x, x took place in the streets of Bologna, and x was going on at 2 a.m.'.
In this way, the entailment relations which were not properly expressed before, go through directly in this analysis.
On the present analysis, ordinary sentences about events like 'Doris capsized the canoe yesterday', will be as much true if she capsized it a dozen times. But it does not make sense to ask 'which time are you referring to'?
It is important to distinguish between:
'Doris capsized the canoe yesterday'
'Doris's capsizing of the canoe occurred yesterday'
While the second sentence indeed contains a singular description (There is an event identical with the capsizing of the canoe yesterday by Doris', the first merely asserts the existence of at least one capsizing.
IDENTITY OF EVENTS: Do place and time together uniquely define an event? That is, is it sufficient as well as necessary, if events are to be identical, that they occupy exactly the same time and the same place?
Davidson gives counterexamples, which he retracts in a later essay, ie., essay B in the Appendices, viz., 'Reply to Quine on Events'.
Finally, Davidson gives the following definition of identity of events:
According to him, events are identical if and only they have exactly the same causes and effects. Events have a unique position in the framework of causal relations between events in somewhat the way objects have a unique position in the spatial framework of objects.
ESSAY 9. EVENTS as PARTICULARS (1970) This essay defends and elaborates on the event ontology proposed in essay six. It was written in response to papers by Roderick Chisholm.
Things change, but are there such things as changes?
A pebble moves, a land slides, a star explodes. Are there in addition to pebbles and stars, movements, births, landslides, and explosions? Our language seems to indicate that there are, by supplying not only the appropriate singular terms, but the full apparatus of definite and indefinite articles, sortal predicates, counting, quantification, and identity-statements; all the machinery of reference.
These seem to indicate that events exist as 'concrete individuals'.
Some things recur, or happen more than once; egg., 'last night I dropped a saucer of mud, and tonight I did it again (exactly the same thing happened). The 'it' here looks for a reference, a thing that can recur.
One way to say would be that one and the same event 'my dropping a saucer of mud' was instantiated both last night and tonight. Or, we could say that one member of the class of my droppings of saucer of mud occurred last night and another tonight. Chisholm observes that these analyses require two sorts of events, universals or classes on one hand and instances or members on the other. Davidson argues in length to show that Chisholm's theory cannot cope with the problem of adverbial modification.
Davidson concludes that it is unclear whether a viable alternative to the theory of events as particulars can be worked out along the lines proposed by Chisholm. Chisholm's approach treats event locutions much like mass nouns.
The paper ends without definite conclusions. Davidson however admits that Chisholm's paper gives us an idea how interesting it might be if such a theory was successfully elaborated.
Essay 10. ETERNAL vs EPHEMERAL EVENTS (1971) This essay too, was written in response to papers by Roderick Chisholm. The matter of this essay is very much related to essay nine. In this essay however, Davidson arrives at concrete results.
Both Roderick Chisholm and Davidson agree that there are events, but do not agree about what the events are.
According to Davidson, some sentences certainly commit us to the existence of a certain object: i.e., an event as an object. E.g.,
1) The explorer was in the cellar 2) The explosion was in the cellar.
The first of these sentences commits us to the existence of an explorer, a particular one picked out by a singular term 'the explorer'. In a parallel way, the second sentence seems to commit us to the existence of a particular event. This is supported by the fact that 1) ,2) respectively entail:
3) There was an explorer in the cellar 4) There was an explosion in the cellar.
1) is true if and only if there was exactly one explorer in the cellar; while 3) is true if and only if there was at least one.
1) can be rewritten as:
'The x such that x is an explorer was in the cellar',
and 3) as:
'There exists an x such that x is an explorer and x was in the cellar'.
Similarly for 2 & 4. Thus, 'explorer' and 'explosions' alike invite the definite and indefinite article; they also invite plural forms, universal quantification, counting and identity statements.
It may be granted that nouns like 'explosion', 'death', 'collapse', 'disasters in the family', and so on, exhibit the same patterns of inference other common nouns do, and so we must expect the ontological assumptions that justify quantificational inference to apply here too.
But how about sentences that contain only the corresponding verbs? In the following:
5) The boiler exploded in the cellar.
There is no singular term to refer to an event, nor common noun to treat like a predicate true of events. However, there are good reasons for treating 5) as involving quantification over events, as having roughly the following logical form:
6) There exists an x such that x was an explosion, and x was in the cellar, and x was of the boiler.
In this way, we articulate the relations between the verb and the noun. That is, by treating 5) along the lines of 6), we explain why it is caught up in the network of entailments that intuition recognizes.
Events over which the variables of quantification in sentences like 6) must range, as in 2) & 4) & 5), are particular EPHEMERAL EVENTS. If the boiler exploded twice, there were at least two distinct explosions, and in symbols:
(Ex)(Ey)(x is an explosion & x is of the boiler & y is an explosion & y is of the boiler & x=/=y).
If we treat 'x is an explosion' as a predicate true of events, and expressions like 'the explosion of the boiler' as referring terms, THEN, we have chosen to include ephemeral events in our ontology.
SECTION III: PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
ESSAY 11. MENTAL EVENTS (1970) This essay argues that although psychological and physical phenomena are causally connected, and this implies that there are strict laws that cover the instancing events, nevertheless there are no strict laws that cover events or states described in psychological terms. In the course of explaining how this can be, a version of the identity theory emerges, which Davidson calls 'anomalous monism'.
How can the causal role of mental events like perceivings, rememberings, decisions, and actions be reconciled with the physical world?
Davidson starts from the assumption that both the causal dependence and the anomalousness of mental events are undeniable facts.
I) The first principle asserts that at least some mental events interact causally with physical events. Call this the 'Principle of Causal Interaction'. Though perception and action provide the most obvious cases where mental and physical events interact causally, there can be mental events that have no physical events as causes or effects.
II) The second principle is that, where there is causality, there must be a law: events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws. Davidson calls it 'The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality'.
III) The third principle is that there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained (The Anomalism of the Mental).
The rest of the paper falls into three parts. The first part describes a version of the identity theory of the mental and the physical that show how the three principles may be reconciled. The second part argues that there cannot be strict psychophysical laws. This is not quite the principle of the anomalism of the mental, though it entails it. The last part tries to derive the truth of the identity theory that identifies at least some mental events with the physical events.
ESSAY 12. PSYCHOLOGY as PHILOSOPHY(1974) This essay further develops the arguments against the possibility of strict psychophysical laws, and stresses the central importance of a normative concept of rationality, in the attribution of beliefs, intentions, desires and other such attitudes.
A desire and belief of the right sort may explain an action, but not necessarily.
The essay is followed by Davidson's replies to Peters, Attfield, and to Solomon,
ESSAY 13. THE MATERIAL MIND (1973) This essay, raises the question how much we can hope to learn about the psychology of thought and action from advances in neurophysiology. Suppose we understand what goes on in the brain perfectly, in the sense that we can describe each detail in purely physical terms- that even the electrical and chemical processes, and certainly the neurological ones have been reduced to physics. That is, let's imagine that ''l'homme machine'' has actually been built. The question is, what would all this knowledge of physics,(and ï¿½ fortiori of neurophysiology) tell us about psychology? Davidson argues that it will be much less than expected.
Davidson treats psychology as a subject that deals with concepts that involve intention, belief, desire, action, decision, memory, perception, learning, wanting, attending, noticing etc.
According to Davidson, the detailed knowledge of the physics or physiology of the brain, or of the whole man would not provide a shortcut to the kind of interpretation required for the application of sophisticated psychological concepts. That is, there is no important sense in which psychology can be reduced to the physical sciences.
ESSAY 14. HEMPEL ON EXPLAINING ACTION (1976) This essay, like essay eight, was written to celebrate the intellectual and other virtues of Carl Hempel. The present Essay, 'Hempel on Explaining action', acknowledges him as an early partisan of the causal view of action, but takes issue with him on the role of empirical laws in explaining action.
Hempel argued in his paper 'Rational Action' that, explanation of intentional action by appeal to the agent's reasons does not differ in its general logical character from explanation generally. Two years later Davidson published 'Actions, Reasons and Causes'. In this paper, Davidson compares the two papers, and looks for the similarities and differences in their thesis.
Hempel set out to show that reason explanations do not differ in their general logical character from explanation in Physics and elsewhere. Davidson agrees with this view.
He however differs on the following point.
The laws that are implicit in reason explanation concern only individuals. They are generalizations embedded in attributions of attitudes, beliefs and traits.
Essay 15. HUME'S COGNITIVE THEORY OF PRIDE (1976). This essay outlines a thesis that even a state like 'being proud' can be a causer.
Here, Davidson defends an Humean analysis of certain passions and emotions, and in particular defends Hume's claim that a belief that one has a beautiful house(for example) is a causal condition of being proud that one has a beautiful house. As in essay one and subsequent essays, Davidson argues that it may be a necessary truth that an event or state, described in a certain way, has a certain cause. Whether or not this is consistent with Hume's analysis of causality is an open question. In any case, if the view of the nature of 'propositional' pride and other such emotions which Davidson argues for here is right, it shows how pride, like the actions for which it may provide a reason, enters the causal chains that help explain and to some extent justify human patterns of feeling, thought and behaviour.
APPENDIX A: ADVERBS OF ACTION (1985) 'Adverbs of action', rehearses the arguments in favor of an ontology of events, and tries to answer a number of perplexing issues about the identity of events. It is thus directly relevant to many of the essays in this book, particularly, essays three, six and eight. Some proposals of essay eight have been reviewed here.
Actions are events and most of the linguistic devices we have for talking of actions are in use for events generally. Adverbial modifications provide a lead for understanding what actions and events are, and how they are individuated. Adverbs modify verbs. Modifiers are attendants, not first movers. Sentences can get along without them.
Adjectives on the other hand, have a standard predicative use ('he was young and bold') which does not allow deletion. Also, adjectives can be converted to complete predicates by the addition of 'is' or 'was' etc. The rule of inference that leads from 'This is a woolen hat' to 'This is a hat' to 'This is woolen' is just the rule that says that if a conjunction of predicates applies to an entity, each of the predicate does.
The same line does not apply to adverbs. For, though the predicate 'x flew swiftly' does imply 'x flew', there is no obvious way to convert 'swiftly' into a free-standing predicate we can apply to x whenever we can apply 'x flew swiftly'. This may not seem quite true. For we can infer from 'x flew swiftly' that there is something x did that was done swiftly. Here, however, 'swiftly' is not predicated of x, but of something done by x: in short, an action.
Thus, adverbs prompt us to recognize actions and events as 'entities'. Sentences like 'He ran to her side' do not 'refer' to events, but they imply the existence of an event of certain sort: Existential quantification over events is the underlying logical form of such simple sentences. In a sentence like 'A game of tennis is a pleasure', Universal quantification comes naturally.
'For all events e, if e is a game of tennis, then e is a pleasure'.
'Gregory sang a song', or 'Peter ran to Canterbury' seem, always to require an agent, but NOT an OBJECT. Then, 'singing' is always represented by a predicate of an agent and an event; the event may then be characterized at will as having an object or not.
If we think of predicates in the usual way as having a fixed number of places, there are no simple predicates that are both transitive and intransitive. 'Shem kicked Shaun' contains an intransitive verb provided it entails 'Shem kicked' and provided 'Shem kicked' does not entail 'Shem kicked something'.
If adverbial clauses are correctly perceived as predicates of events, it follows that by adding adverbial clauses to characterize events, we can at most be reducing the stock of events characterized.
Thus, events once more seem on a par, ontologically, with familiar objects like men and giraffe.
APPENDIX B: REPLY TO QUINE ON EVENTS (1985) Appendix B is a reply to Quine's criticism of a condition of identity for events which Davidson had proposed in Essay eight. Though here he agrees with Quine that his original proposal was circular, which presupposed an ontology of events, he resists his view that there is no clear distinction between objects and events.
CRITICAL EVALUATION So long as we divide Linguistics into compartmentalized subjects, Philosophy will remain only Philosophy, Syntax only Syntax and so on. This is especially true for those of us who have never been taught Philosophy as a Linguistics course. And yet, I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book, though, it needs a lot of concentration to follow the intricate arguments that Davidson uses to build his thesis. What amazed me was the amount of valuable information it imparted from the point of view of Syntax, which is my primary interest. Hence, though this book will naturally be a 'must' for students of philosophy, it must be read by linguists of all disciplines, in spite of the fact that it is not presented in the form of a standard text book. A lot of syntax would become clearer if we 'structurally' incorporate the thesis presented in this work.
REFERENCES Austin, J. L. (1961): 'Ifs and Cans', in 'Philosophical Papers'. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 123-152.
Chisholm, R. (1966): 'Freedom and Action', in 'Freedom and Determinism', ed., K. Lehrer. Random House, New York, 28-44.
Davidson, D. (1967): 'Truth and Meaning', Synthï¿½se 17,304-23.
Hempel, C. G. (1962): 'Rational Action', in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. The Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 5-24.
Hume, D. (1970) 'A Dissertation on the Passions', in Four Dissertations. Garland Publishers, New York, 121-181.
Kenny, A. J. P. (1963): 'Action, Emotion and Will'. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Melden, A. I.(1961): 'Free Action'. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Quine, W. V. O. (1969): 'Existence and Quantification', in Fact and Existence, ed. J. Margolis, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1-17.
Wittgenstein, L. W. (1958): 'Blue and Brown Books'. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
ABOUT THE REVIEWER:
ABOUT THE REVIEWER Sharbani Banerji has done her PhD (2002) in Minimalist Syntax from Centre for Applied Linguistics and Translation Studies, University of Hyderabad, INDIA. The title of her thesis was 'Grammar of Case and Adpositions-A Parametric Study'. Earlier she did her M.Phil Linguistics from Jawahar Lal Nehru University New Delhi. She also did her Masters in Physics from Delhi University. Her research interests include Morphology, Minimalist Syntax, Semantics, and their application in Computational Linguistics. She is presently trying to perfect as well as further the work related to her thesis, besides working on some papers.