This book is about beliefs, language, communication and cognition. It deals with the fundamental issue of the interpretation of the speaker's utterance expressing a belief and reporting on beliefs of other people in the form of oratio obliqua. The main aim of the book is to present a new account of the problem of interpreting utterances expressing beliefs and belief reports in terms of an approach called Default Semantics.
AUDIENCE: Students and researchers in linguistics (especially semantics and pragmatics), social anthropology, and philosophy of language.
CONTENTS (Chapter Headings only):
Semantic Ambiguities and Semantic Underspecification.
Intentionality and Propositional Attitudes
The Default De Re Principle
Lexicon and the Power of Referring
Vehicles of Thought in Attitude Ascription
Discourse Representation Theory and Propositional Attitudes
Belief Reports in a Contrastive Perspective
Dinouement: Double Occam's Razor
REVIEW: 'extremely interesting and original...the majority of researchers interested in this topic are explicitly aware of the fact that it crosses the boundary between (linguistics and philosophy). This book clearly crosses that boundary and seems to have a broader scope than most works in this area.' Dr Billy Clark, Middlesex University, September 1996